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The enactment of the counter-terrorism ‘Prevent duty’ in British 
schools and colleges: Beyond reluctant accommodation or 
straightforward policy acceptance 
When Britain imposed the ‘Prevent duty’, a legal duty on education, health and 
social welfare organisations to report concerns about individuals identified as at-
risk of radicalisation, critics argued it would accentuate the stigmatisation of 
Muslim communities, ‘chill’ free speech, and exacerbate societal securitisation. 
Based on 70 interviews with educational professionals and a national online 
survey (n=225), this article examines their perceptions of how the duty has 
played out in practice. It then provides an explanation for why, contrary to 
expectations, not only has overt professional opposition been limited, but there 
has been some evidence of positive acceptance. It is argued that these findings 
neither simply reflect reluctant policy accommodation nor do they simply reflect 
straightforward policy acceptance, but rather they comprise the outcome of multi-
level processes of policy narration, enactment and adaptation. Three processes 
are identified as being of particular importance in shaping education 
professionals’ engagement with the duty: the construction of radicalisation as a 
significant societal, institutional and personal risk; the construction of continuity 
between the Prevent duty and existing professional practices; and the 
responsibilisation of first-line professionals. The conclusion reflects on the wider 
public and policy implications of these findings. 
Keywords: Prevent; counter-terrorism; schools; education; Prevent duty; 
enactment 
Introduction 
Programmes for the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) have become central to 
international, national and local counter terrorism strategies. Within this context, the 
evolution of the Prevent strategy, the strand of the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
concerned with stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, has been a 
particular focus of global attention. Indeed, as one of the first strategies of its kind, 
Prevent has, since it was first implemented in 2007, provided something of a model for 
the development and diffusion of national and international level PVE strategies and 
programmes (Kundnani and Hayes 2018). It has however also attracted sustained 
criticism (Thomas 2014). It has been accused of unfairly targeting, and therefore 
stigmatising, Muslims – a criticism grounded partly in the fact that the initial version of 
Prevent explicitly focused on Muslim communities (Choudhury 2010); and of 
‘securitising’ community relations and carrying out surveillance under the guise of 
community engagement – accusations that Arun Kundnani’s ‘Spooked’ (2009) report 
and a highly-critical Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry (House of Commons 
2010) demonstrated were not entirely without foundation. In addition, the scientific 
underpinnings of Prevent – the concept of a process of ‘radicalisation’ that can be 
reliably identified and then disrupted – have come under frequent challenge (Coolsaet 
2016; Kundnani 2012). 
In July 2015, Britain further extended the Prevent strategy, taking the 
internationally-unprecedented step of imposing a legal duty on ‘specified authorities’, 
including schools and further education colleges (‘colleges’),i universities, health and 
social services, to show ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism’ [Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s.26.], popularly referred to as the 
‘Prevent duty’. For schools and colleges, statutory and supplemental guidance sets out 
two areas of responsibility: ensuring that ‘staff are able to identify children who may be 
vulnerable to radicalisation and know what to do when they are identified,’ and 
‘build[ing] pupils’ resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values 
and enabling them to challenge extremist views’ (Department for Education (DfE) 
2015, 5). 
As expected, the duty quickly became the focus of sustained, often vociferous, 
criticism from teaching unions, academics and civil society campaigners. Critics argued 
that the pressure to report terrorism-related concerns would have a ‘chilling effect’ on 
free speech in the classroom; risked securitising educational spaces; would deepen 
stigmatisation and suspicion of British Muslims; put further strain on over-stretched 
educational institutions and professionals by ‘responsibilising’ (Thomas, 2017) 
educational institutions and individual professionals for the prevention of terrorism; and 
might even play into the hands of those seeking to recruit young people into terrorism 
by intensifying antipathy towards the state (Davies 2016; Durodie 2016; Liberty 2015; 
Muslim Council of Britain 2016;). 
The Home Office, the Department for Education (DfE) and civil society 
supporters of the legislation responded by arguing that the duty ‘doesn’t and shouldn’t 
stop schools from discussing controversial issues’ (Williams 2015). In keeping with 
their wider framing of the Prevent strategy, they presented the duty as a straightforward 
extension of existing responsibilities to ‘safeguard’ students in relation to issues such as 
drugs, gangs, neglect and sexual exploitation, and claimed that, since ‘the Prevent duty 
is entirely consistent with schools’ and childcare providers’ existing responsibilities’ it 
‘should not be burdensome’ (DfE 2015, 5). They also emphasized that the duty pertains 
to all forms of extremism, and put in place training and guidance to support schools, 
colleges and other specified authorities. 
This did little to quell concerns, however. Indeed, criticism intensified as the 
duty came into force and some high-profile public figures went so far as to describe 
Prevent as a ‘toxic brand’, calling for it to be scrapped (e.g. Peraudin 2016). Perceptions 
that Prevent as a whole generates discriminatory structures of surveillance on Muslim 
communities and that the duty is liable to encourage the securitisation of educational 
spaces were given further fuel by a dramatic increase in referrals to Channel, the 
government’s voluntary scheme for anti-radicalisation mentoring – a total of 4,611 
people, including more than 2,000 children and teenagers, were identified for possible 
interventions between July 2015 and June 2016, a 75% year-on-year rise in the first year 
of the duty’s operation – and by media reports of apparently absurd cases in which 
students, almost always of Muslim background, had been questioned by the police after 
staff raised concerns, such as the four-year-old whose picture of a ‘cooker bomb’ turned 
out to be a picture of a clumsily-pronounced cucumber (Open Society Justice Initiative 
2016). 
The Prevent-as-safeguarding frame used by government in their presentation of 
the duty has also continued to be challenged. Social work academics, for example, have 
argued that the logic of Prevent is not the same as that which has traditionally 
underpinned safeguarding, since safeguarding is supposed to be about protecting 
children, not protecting society from what children might do (Coppock and McGovern 
2014), and that the concept of vulnerability entailed by the Prevent-as-safeguarding 
frame ‘risks silencing and even pathologising the person labelled vulnerable’ rather than 
understanding and engaging with their practices as acts of dissent (O’Donnell 2016, 53). 
Such arguments have been strengthened by empirical evidence from the duty’s 
implementation within mental health departments of the National Health Service, which 
shows healthcare practitioners questioning the assertion that the Prevent duty fits 
unproblematically within existing safeguarding approaches (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 
2018a; 2018b). 
Alongside this, criticism has persisted of what has been seen as Prevent’s lack of 
consistent and sustained focus on educational approaches that can actually help young 
people build the resilience and skills to identify, critique and resist extremist ideologies 
and attempts to draw them in to extremist activity (Thomas 2016). Here, the 
assimilationist-tinged promotion of so-called fundamental British values has been a 
particular focus of criticism due to concerns that it lends itself to the stigmatisation and 
pathologisation of groups of students or sets of perspectives that are deemed somehow 
less British (Richardson 2015; Winter and Mills 2018).  
Within the context of such polarised and contentious policy debate, there is an 
urgent requirement for detailed empirical research that examines how this statutory duty 
has played out on the ground. In this article we respond to this requirement by reporting 
on a national mixed-methods study of education professionals’ perceptions of how the 
duty played out in schools and colleges during the first 18 months of its operation. The 
study centred on four questions:  
1) How has the new Prevent duty been interpreted by staff in schools and colleges 
in England?  
2) How confident do school/college staff feel with regards to implementing the 
Prevent duty and what, if anything, could be done to enhance their confidence? 
3) What impacts, if any, do school/college staff think the Prevent duty has had on 
their school or college, and in particular on their interactions with students and 
parents? 
4) To what extent, if at all, have school/college staff opposed or questioned the 
legitimacy of the Prevent duty? 
In this article we focus in particular on the description and analysis of an 
apparent tension within the data, the interpretation of which is likely to have significant 
implications for debates about PVE, and specifically PVE in education, in the UK and 
beyond: while some education professionals echoed the critiques of the Prevent duty 
outlined above, we encountered scant evidence of expressed opposition to the duty. 
Indeed, there is even some evidence of positive acceptance. 
After considering, and setting aside, some of the most straightforward and, 
arguably, most politically expedient, explanations for these findings, we develop an 
explanation grounded in analysis of the ‘enactment’ (Ball, Maguire and Braun 2013) of 
the duty within the case study schools and colleges and of the intersecting policy and 
practice narratives that shaped such enactment (Jones 2013). As Ball et al (2013) 
demonstrate, educational institutions and their staff do not simply ‘implement’ national 
policy directives. Rather, they modify and amend policy as they interpret it within their 
wider, ongoing professional and institutional practices. On this view, if we are to 
understand how policy translates into practice, it is necessary to analyse the front-line 
processes of translation and implementation of the government’s educational directives 
at ground level – by institutions and by individual ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 
2013) – and their concomitant ‘assemblages’ (Ball et al 2013) of practices, including 
professional briefing documents, face to face training and day-to-day working norms.  
In undertaking this analysis we reveal an intriguing possibility: while the 
introduction of the legal duty undoubtedly intensified criticism of Prevent among 
sections of the public, the way it has been integrated into the everyday working 
practices of schools and colleges might have given rise to a process of detoxification of 
the ‘Prevent brand’ among education professionals. We reflect on the policy and 
political implications of this in the conclusion. 
Methods 
The research combined 70 semi-structured interviews with staff from fourteen schools 
and colleges in two regions of England: London and West Yorkshire; semi-structured 
interviews with local Prevent practitioners in eight local authority areas (data not 
discussed in this article); and an online survey of school and college staff in England 
(n=225). 
Interviews 
Schools and colleges were approached through the researchers’ existing professional 
networks and local authority channels such as headteachers’ bulletins. Institutions were 
selected to ensure a balance of primary schools, secondary schools and colleges and, 
reflecting the prominence of concerns about Prevent’s impact on Muslim students 
specifically, a range of student demographics in terms of the proportion of white British, 
black and minority ethnic (BME), and Muslim students. 
In each institution, 3-6 staff members across a range of roles and with varying 
levels of experience and involvement with the implementation of the Prevent duty were 
interviewed. This included teaching and non-teaching staff, and in each institution 
included the Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL): the individual with primary 
responsibility for the implementation of the duty (Table 1).  
Table 1: Interview Sample Summary 
Role/Position No. of 
Interviewees 
% of total no. 
Interviewees 
Senior leaders 
Heads/deputy heads/ principals/ senior management 
team members 
14 20% 
Middle leaders 
Heads of department/ heads of year-group/service 
leaders 
25 36% 
Teachers/lecturers 
 
10 14% 
Teaching assistants 
 
5 7% 
Support or technical staff 
e.g. learning mentors, progress coaches, pastoral staff, 
librarians, IT staff and members of estate teams 
16 23% 
Total 70  
Of which: 
Designated Safeguarding Leads 
 
16 
 
23% 
Non-Designated Safeguarding Leads 54 77% 
 
In the first part of each interview the respondent was asked to describe their experience 
of the Prevent duty. A narrative interview strategy was used to enable respondents to 
discuss and emphasise what they considered the most significant elements of their 
experiences, and to encourage respondents not to reproduce professional scripts or 
habitual discourses (Wengraf 2001). After probing their initial responses, the 
interviewers asked more targeted questions pertaining to the core research questions. 
Informed written consent was obtained prior to each interview. All interviews were 
confidential, audio-recorded and fully transcribed for analysis. After a first reading of 
the transcripts, an initial thematic coding frame was developed. All transcripts were 
then coded by at least two team members, and the coding frame reassessed and updated 
to reflect analysis. 
Online survey  
An online survey, on the Bristol Online Survey platform, was used to explore and test 
hypotheses emerging from the interview data. The survey was promoted via emails to 
schools and colleges from universities and local authorities, via the e-bulletins of 
teaching unions and national college networks, and was advertised at the end of an 
article by the researchers that appeared in the Times Educational Supplement in 
November 2016.  
To maximize access, the survey was accessible via a URL without a password. 
This created a risk that the survey could be completed by campaigners in favour of or 
opposed to the duty. To mitigate this risk, we monitored the survey for bursts of 
activity, whether respondents only completed the questions most likely to generate a 
headline finding, and identical sets of responses. The survey took approximately 15 
minutes to complete. 
The survey was conducted between 18 October and 23 December 2016. After 
removal of incomplete responses and duplicates, 203 completed responses remained. A 
subsequent password protected booster survey was carried out in March 2017,ii 
promoted via email by the National Association of Head Teachers and the Muslim 
Teachers’ Association in order to increase the number of responses from school and 
college leaders and from Muslim education professionals. The final sample contained 
225 completed responses (Table 2).  
Survey responses were aggregated and subjected to a series of systematic cross-
tabulations to explore simple correlations. Sample size was insufficient to undertake 
regression analysis. 
Table 2: Survey Sample Summary 
 No. of 
Intervieweesiii 
% of total 
question 
responses 
Gender 
Women 69 31% 
Men 156 69% 
Ethnicity 
White British 173 81% 
Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 41 19% 
Religion 
Christian 88 42% 
Muslim  25 12% 
Religion other than Christian or Muslim 7 3% 
No Religion 90 43% 
Role in school/college 
Senior leaders 52 23% 
Teachers/lecturers 82 36% 
Trainee teachers/lecturers, teaching assistants and 
educational support workers 
37 16% 
Otheriv 54 24% 
Safeguarding role 
DSL 68 30% 
Non-DSL 157 70% 
Type of institution 
School 118 53% 
College 106 47% 
Region 
Yorkshire and Humberside 44 20% 
East of England 37 17% 
North West 36 16% 
London 35 16% 
East Midlands 26 12% 
South East 25 11% 
West Midlands 10 5% 
South West 5 2% 
North East 1 0.5% 
Ethnic/religious mix of school/college 
Mainly White British 102 45% 
Diverse 98 44% 
Mainly from one ethnic/religious background other than 
White British 
24 11% 
Estimated proportion of Muslim students in the school/college 
Less than 10% 106 51% 
11-15% 29 14% 
Results: Educationalists’ perceptions of the impacts of the Prevent duty  
Given the criticism of the Prevent duty, particularly from some teaching unions, we 
expected to find widespread professional concern about and expressed opposition to the 
Prevent duty. These expectations were only partially borne out by the data. 
A significant proportion of respondents did express some concerns regarding the 
Prevent duty. The most prominent of these related to the potential stigmatisation of 
Muslim students. Even though a significant majority of interview and survey 
respondents believed the duty is intended to address all forms of extremism (82% of 
survey respondents agreed or agreed strongly that ‘the Prevent duty is about all forms of 
extremism’), concern that the duty had the potential to exacerbate the stigmatisation of 
Muslim students was a recurring theme during interviews, and over half the survey 
respondents said the duty had made Muslim students more likely (43%), or considerably 
more likely (14%), to feel stigmatised (Figure 1). Such concerns were particularly 
prevalent among BME respondents, 75% of whom said the Prevent duty had made 
Muslim students ‘more’, or ‘considerably more’, likely to feel stigmatised.  
Figure 1: Has the Prevent duty made it more likely or less likely that Muslim 
students might feel stigmatised? 
 
That such concerns were so prevalent alongside broad acceptance that the duty is 
intended to address all forms of extremism is perhaps surprising. One possible 
explanation relates to respondents’ appreciation that the impacts of the Prevent duty are 
being shaped by a broader social and political context of significant anti-Muslim 
sentiment, in which young Muslims already feel they are under special scrutiny 
(Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2013). For example, one DSL who subscribed to the idea 
that the duty was intended to address all forms of extremism nonetheless also expressed 
the view that Muslim students were particularly likely to be affected by it and 
experience it as ‘just another thing that is being put upon them’: 
It must be really difficult for Muslim kids […] they feel constantly vilified and that 
actually in a sense pushes them further into isolation because as Muslims they feel 
[the Prevent duty] is just another thing that is being put upon them to monitor them 
and to vilify them. I do think the kids are resentful of that. (R50, DSL, school, 
London) 
Another possible explanation relates to professional anxieties about the challenges of 
implementing the duty in a way that is genuinely even-handed. Some respondents 
observed that, regardless of the intention of the government or individual teachers, the 
monitoring and reporting procedures that Prevent entails might remain 
disproportionately focused on Muslim students due to the limited confidence of some 
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white (presumably non-Muslim) teachers to interpret the practices of Muslim students. 
As one respondent explained: 
[…] if you’re being realistic, the demographic of our teaching staff is white, and so 
any extremism from the far right, although it might be uncomfortable, it’s more 
within your experience, and you feel better placed to judge how extreme you feel 
that is and whether you need to report on it. […] Whereas maybe the Muslim 
extremism, you would feel like you had to report everything on if you didn’t feel 
you had that. (R5, senior leader, school, Yorkshire) 
Alongside concerns about stigmatisation of Muslim students were concerns that the 
Prevent duty was making it more difficult to foster socially-cohesive educational 
institutions at a time when racial, ethnic and religious identities were increasingly a 
source of societal division. As one respondent reflected, 
When I first came to this Borough there was quite a divide I would say between 
Muslims and other communities. As time went on and maybe they started to 
enmesh together a bit more and there was lots of work within the Borough to get 
communities to work together and understand each other; to get all the children to 
actually be together. And then as things have happened within the world and 
people’s reactions to what happens in the world, and I am not saying this is just 
Prevent, but it is a reaction to things that have happened politically. The children 
feel like they don’t come together like; they retreat back into what they know. 
(R55, senior leader, school, London) 
While the Prevent duty was not seen as the underlying cause of these problems, it was 
perceived to be exacerbating more general societal disintegration. Such concerns were 
again particularly prominent among BME respondents, with 39% of BME survey 
respondents, as compared with 23% of non-BME respondents, stating that the Prevent 
duty makes it ‘more difficult’ or ‘considerably more difficult’ ‘for schools/colleges to 
create an environment in which students from different backgrounds get on well with 
one another’.   
Figure 2: Do you think the Prevent duty makes it easier or more difficult for 
schools/colleges to create an environment in which students from different 
backgrounds get on well with one another? By White British / BME respondents 
 
Such concerns were often associated with expressed misgivings about the requirement 
to promote fundamental British values. Almost all the respondents observed that 
teaching values had long been part of their professional practice. The concern however 
was that framing them specifically as British values might, whatever the intention, play 
into the hands of the far right by propagating notions of fixed and definable cultural 
boundaries that could be used to mark out and marginalize those deemed un-British or 
less-British, echoing discussions elsewhere in the critical literature on the promotion of 
fundamental British values (Elton-Chalcroft et al. 2017).  
I suppose it’s a little bit like the late 70s and the early 80s when the mod thing was 
going on and the N[ational] F[ront] jumped on the British flags, you know? There 
is this thought that, if we label it as British values is somebody else going to pick 
this up and do that with it? Also, are they just values for Britain? You know, we are 
trying to produce global citizens, we are trying to produce people that can work, 
learn, be, citizens of the world and also we don’t want people misunderstanding 
and thinking that only British people can have these values. (R49, senior leader, 
school, London) 
Indeed, in some institutions staff and governors continued to talk about school/college 
values or universal values instead of fundamental British values even though they 
believed that Inspectors would expect and prefer the latter: 
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We don’t say ‘these are British values’, no we don’t. We don’t. That would feel 
fake. ‘These are our values’, we don’t say ‘these are British values’, we say ‘these 
are our values’. (R38, DSL, school, London) 
A further set of concerns were related to the effectiveness of the duty. The interview 
and survey data indicate fairly high levels of confidence about meeting the duty’s 
requirements, particularly among senior and more experienced staff – 76% of survey 
respondents described themselves as ‘very confident’ or ‘fairly confident’ about 
implementing the duty, as compared with only 9% who described themselves as ‘not 
very confident’ or ‘not very confident at all’; a finding that broadly coincides with a 
2015 DfE omnibus survey (Straw, Tattersall and Sims 2016). Nonetheless, the interview 
data also revealed a strong undertow of anxiety about whether the duty would work in 
practice. Such concerns centred primarily on the perceived difficulty of identifying so-
called ‘genuine’ cases – i.e. students seriously engaged with extremism rather than, for 
example, those who were testing boundaries or who didn’t realise the potential gravity 
of their actions – a product of widespread scepticism about whether such students would 
do things that would give themselves away. 
If someone is genuinely involved, you wouldn’t know. You wouldn’t know. And 
that is very hard for us as lecturers to police, and that’s what our, as lecturers, our 
main concern was… They’re not going to walk around with something to give you 
indicators, are they? If they’re doing researching they’re most probably doing it at 
home, if they’re being radicalised they’re most probably doing it in their personal 
space or time. (R69, middle manager, college, London)  
Such concerns were fuelled by high profile cases in which students had become 
involved with extremism but where, respondents believed, there had not been any 
‘warning signs’ that this was happening. A case in which three female students from a 
school in Bethnal Green, London, travelled to Syria was referenced with particular 
frequency. Here, respondents exemplified such challenges with observations about how 
the three students had been ‘good students’ or ‘top students’:  
I have a group of 22 girls who I feel as though I know every one of them well, but 
do I? Enough? As a teacher to stop that happening? If that were to happen, I just, I 
think I would go over and over it again thinking ‘what did I miss, what did I miss?’ 
I just don’t think you can always know. They [the students from Bethnal Green] 
were top students, well behaved, they never did anything out of the ordinary. And 
then they disappeared. […] How do you spot that? I don’t know if you can. (R48, 
teacher, school, London) 
Anxiety about missing genuine cases was magnified by fears about the possible 
consequences of doing so for the students, themselves and their colleagues. 
Respondents expressed concerns that the institution could be ‘dragged over the coals’ 
(R43, teacher, school, London) or ‘pilloried’ (R1, DSL, college, Yorkshire) if they did 
miss something: fears sometimes grounded in their understandings of what had 
happened in other, in some cases nearby, institutions. The emotional costs of feeling 
that they had failed to do everything they could also loomed large. 
I think there is an element that means that, it’s not about what might happen to me 
or what might happen to a colleague so much as what I might feel like or what a 
colleague might feel like if we had been party to a piece of information that we 
then haven’t acted on. Then we find out that something has happened with that 
child. That, I don’t think it bears thinking about. (R49, senior leader, school, 
London)   
This left some staff navigating their way through competing fears – on the one hand 
‘terrified to miss something’ that could be a sign of vulnerability to radicalisation; on 
the other worrying about stereotyping minority students.  
In your head, you’re always wondering whether a behaviour might be typical of 
that [radicalisation], because you’re terrified to miss something. But by the same 
token, you’re also not wanting to be, in a white-staffed, predominantly white, 
working-class school, putting on your Prevent helmet every single time you’re 
talking to a student from an ethnic minority. (R11, lecturer, college, Yorkshire) 
Among staff with responsibilities for managing the implementation of the duty within 
their institution, such anxieties intersected with concerns about the associated additional 
workload and budgetary pressures. While government guidance asserts that the duty 
should not be ‘burdensome’ (DfE 2015, 5), respondents described significant resource 
allocation to meet the perceived requirements of the duty, particularly during the first 
year. Over half of the senior leaders who completed the survey (54%) reported that the 
duty had increased their workload ‘a moderate amount’ or ‘a lot’, and 35% said it had 
increased budgetary and resource pressure ‘a moderate amount’ or ‘a lot’. Particularly 
prominent in the interview data are comments about the costs of purchasing adequate 
software to monitor students’ online activity and the human resource and opportunity 
costs of meeting the government’s requirement that 100% of staff in schools and 
colleges should have received Prevent training – a particularly onerous task in larger or 
split-site institutions. 
This series of concerns corresponds broadly with the critiques of the Prevent 
duty outlined in the introduction. There were however two findings that fit less well 
with the criticism of the duty. First, we did not find evidence of widespread concern that 
the duty was having a ‘chilling effect’ on classrooms. Indeed, 41% of survey 
respondents said the Prevent duty had led to more open discussions ‘about issues such 
as extremism, intolerance and inequality’. 
Figure 3: Perceived impact of the Prevent duty on openness of discussions with 
students about issues such as extremism, intolerance and inequality 
 
This was supported by the interview data where, far from a chilling effect, respondents 
across the fieldsites described how they had used the duty to re-invigorate discussion 
and debate around such topics through a number of democratic engagement projects, a 
point we return to below. 
Second, and supporting Bryan’s (2017) findings, we also did not find evidence 
of widespread overt opposition to the duty. Within the survey data, 54.5% of 
respondents agreed or agreed strongly (1-4 on a scale of 1-10) with the statement that 
the Prevent duty is ‘a proportionate response to a clearly identified problem’, as 
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compared with 29.3% of respondents who disagreed or disagreed strongly (7-10 on the 
same scale).  
Figure 4: How strongly do you agree or disagree that the Prevent duty on schools 
and colleges is a proportionate response to a clearly identified problem? 
 
The interview data support this finding. While most respondents expressed concern 
about what could happen if the Prevent duty was ‘done badly’ (see below), very few 
expressed more general opposition to the duty and there were scant reports of 
conversations with colleagues in which such views were expressed, even in private. 
Indeed, more common were expressions of positive acceptance. For example, there 
were multiple comments about how the duty helped to enhance student safety – ‘this is 
a really good thing and lets us help our children learn how to be safe online and not get 
groomed’ (R24, teacher, school, Yorkshire) – or, as described above, provided 
opportunities to reinvigorate work around citizenship, democracy, and equality. How 
then might we explain why while respondents described several concerns that reflect 
established critiques of Prevent and the Prevent duty, we found little evidence of 
expressed opposition to the duty? 
Discussion: Explaining the relative absence of professional opposition to the 
Prevent duty  
One possible explanation for the relative absence of expressed opposition to the duty 
despite concerns about its potential impacts is that these results reflect a form of 
reluctant accommodation by education professionals. After all, as a legal duty and a 
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central focus of inspection regimes, by the time the policy reached schools and colleges 
there were limited opportunities for dissent. As one DSL explained, 
They [other members of staff] haven’t challenged me on the duty because this is a 
duty, okay? ‘This is a duty and we have to implement it, and if we don’t implement 
it the college could be closed down. So there’s your facts, okay?’ (R1, DSL, 
college, Yorkshire)  
In some institutions at least, respondents reported that such arguments had been 
reinforced by invoking the experiences of other educational institutions that had been 
downgraded by the inspectorate, the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills (OFSTED), for what were seen as failings in this area. 
Some of the Muslim respondents reported having been particularly cautious 
about challenging or voicing opposition to the duty due to concerns about stereotyping 
by their colleagues: 
Me personally, I mean I didn’t speak much [during the Prevent training] because 
obviously me being, as you can see my image, I’m a Muslim, I’ve got a beard. You 
know, if you speak, sometimes people can stereotype what you’re trying to say and 
take it in the wrong context, so I didn’t speak much to be honest. (R69, lecturer, 
college, London) 
Yet the instances of broadly positive engagement with the duty indicate that reluctant 
accommodation is likely only to be part of the story.  
Conversely, it might be argued that these data tell a fairly straightforward story 
of broad policy acceptance: that on balance, while some school and college staff were 
apprehensive about the duty, most broadly saw the duty as a reasonable response to an 
identified problem. Yet such an interpretation would also sit uncomfortably with some 
of our findings, in particular those that relate to the practices of adaptation, 
interpretation and sometimes subtle forms of resistance observed at the ground-level. 
We propose that a fuller and more convincing explanation of the findings can be 
developed if we pay close attention to the everyday enactment of the Prevent duty in 
schools and colleges. Three processes evident within the data appear to be of particular 
relevance. 
The construction of radicalisation as a significant societal, institutional and 
personal risk 
My own personal values in life is that I think that a seventeen-year-old British-born 
male wanting to go to Syria to blow themselves up, whatever your political views, 
is really tragic, and if there’s anything that we can do as an organisation to stop that 
from happening, the same way we’d want to safeguard in any other way, then I can 
only see it as a good thing. (R2, middle manager, college, Yorkshire) 
The first of these three processes relates to the construction of risk narratives. While a 
significant proportion of respondents expressed concern about the unintended 
consequences of the duty, this did not preclude similar if not more widespread 
acceptance of the idea that extremism and radicalisation comprise genuine and salient 
risks. Of the survey respondents, 22.8% described radicalisation as a ‘significant’ or 
‘very significant’ problem in their institution. This rose to 39.2% when asked about the 
local area and 52.1% when asked about Britain, compared with just 16.6% who stated 
that in Britain today the problem of radicalisation is ‘not significant’ or ‘not significant 
at all’. As might be expected, we find a strong positive correlation between perceived 
significance of radicalisation as a problem and belief that the Prevent duty represents a 
proportionate response to a clearly identified issue.  
We also found broad, although far from unanimous, acceptance of the idea that 
radicalisation comprised a genuine risk within the interview data. High profile, and in 
some instances relatively local, cases of young people engaging with terrorist groups or 
travelling to Syria played an important role in shaping these perceptions. Cases such as 
the ‘Bethnal Green girls’ in London and, in West Yorkshire, Talha Asmal, the 'UK's 
youngest ever suicide bomber' (BBC 2015), were particularly prominent. Among senior 
leaders and DSLs, such interpretations of risk were also traced back to conversations 
with local Prevent practitioners: 
We all sat in the meeting [with the local authority Prevent coordinator] and we are 
told that actually in the previous twelve months there have been four or five people 
from [London Borough] that, you know, that have tried to go to Syria to join the 
fighting. Yes, at that point it becomes kind of real doesn’t it, because it could be 
kids that you taught. Or it could be, you know, the family down the road. It does 
become really real. (R49, DSL, school, London) 
The much-repeated claim that radicalisation ‘can happen to anyone’ (R24, 
teacher, school, Yorkshire) – an idea often discussed during Prevent-related training, 
seemingly with the intention of emphasising  that Prevent is not focused only on 
AQ/ISIS-related radicalisation, also served to intensify the perception of the risk of 
radicalisation. It is also likely, given that high levels of anxiety about the effects of a 
particular hazard are associated with increased in risk perception (Sjöberg 2000), that 
perception of the risk of radicalisation was accentuated by the acute fears described 
above about the consequences of a student becoming involved in extremism or 
terrorism. 
Such perceptions of the risk of radicalisation meant that even where respondents 
described the duty as potentially having negative unintended consequences, concerns 
could largely be bracketed with notions of proportionality and the idea that it is, to 
paraphrase a recurring theme within the data, better to be safe than sorry. Missing the 
one genuine case was consistently situated as the apex risk, and a focus for intense 
personal reflection: 
If I can stop one kid breaking his mother’s heart or getting killed or being put in a 
position where the police are after them because they’re attacking animal 
laboratories or he’s going to get beaten up at some far-right rally then I think that’s 
worth what we’re doing. It’s absolutely worth what we’re doing. (R20, DSL, 
college, Yorkshire) 
The construction of such imagined hierarchies of risk, we argue, is likely to have played 
a significant role in undermining opposition to the duty. They do not however explain 
why respondents by and large appear to have accepted, or at least not overtly opposed, 
this particular approach to managing the risk of radicalisation. Why, after all, should 
school and college staff potentially be expected to accept considerable responsibility for 
something over which they might, as many respondents observed, have very little 
control? Two further processes help to provide us with an explanation. 
The construction of continuity with existing professional practices 
While there were frequent comments about increased workload and budgetary 
pressures, and while respondents in each of the institutions where fieldwork took place 
were able to point to new initiatives undertaken in response to the duty, there were also 
repeated observations about how little had changed in practice. Indeed, far from leading 
to ‘vast changes’, most respondents described the Prevent duty as simply ‘confirming’ 
(R59, teacher, school, London) or providing a subtle refocusing of what they had 
already been doing.  
These narratives of professional continuity were most prominent in relation to 
the referral practices that the Prevent duty entailed. A very large majority of survey 
respondents (86%) ‘agreed’ or ‘agreed strongly’ that ‘The Prevent duty in 
schools/colleges is a continuation of existing safeguarding responsibilities’, and the 
interviews are peppered with examples of respondents drawing parallels between 
Prevent-related issues and what were already understood as  ‘safeguarding issues’, 
whether in terms of institutional processes or the ‘signs’ that they might be looking for. 
When you look at the action [required in the case of concerns about vulnerability to 
radicalisation] it’s exactly the same as the actions we’d take against FGM [female 
genital mutilation] and against child sexual exploitation... It is a safeguarding issue. 
It’s the same, it’s about keeping children safe from predators. If you look at, well 
when I look at a profile of a radicaliser … and a groomer it’s the same tactics and 
they’re targeting the same sorts of vulnerabilities in children. (R61, DSL, school, 
London) 
 
We already, you know, thought a lot about students’ safety, about students’ 
wellbeing.  So, it wasn’t like we were trying to shoehorn something in that didn’t 
exist anyway.  We had the structure and the mechanisms to enable us to sort of 
implement the duty. (R11, senior leader, college, Yorkshire)  
It is likely that this identification, and acceptance, of the Prevent duty as a continuation 
of existing safeguarding understandings and practices among education professionals 
goes a long way to explaining why a large majority of the national referrals to the 
Channel process come from the formal education sector and from schools and colleges 
in particular. In contrast with the health sector, where requirements to report concerns 
relating to individual ‘vulnerability’ to radicalisation have been interpreted as a 
deviation from previous safeguarding practices (Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2018a; 
2018b), in educational settings, particularly where students are generally under 18 years 
of age, Prevent’s understanding of individual student ‘vulnerability’ and its systems for 
further investigating this were seen by our respondents at least as being broadly 
congruent with established educational safeguarding systems and institutional cultures 
characterised by mundane, ongoing professional  monitoring and surveillance.  
Such congruence with pre-existing safeguarding and other professional 
procedures might also help to explain why so many respondents perceived the duty to 
be a broadly proportionate response in spite of the very small numbers of young people 
who ever go on to become involved in activities proscribed under counter-terrorism 
legislation. Once a social harm is identified by education professionals as a 
‘safeguarding’ issue, it is broadly accepted that they need to and do respond, whatever 
the national scale of the problem. Even the very high attrition rate of Prevent referrals 
from the education sector – approximately 95% of formal Prevent referrals do not result 
in a Channel intervention (Home Office 2017, 2018) – was seen by respondents as 
simply being consistent with wider safeguarding procedures and a reflection of their 
high threshold for further interventions, and therefore was not viewed as problematic. 
Such narratives of continuity were also evident with regards to the curriculum 
dimension of the duty. In every institution, senior staff described how, after ‘mapping’ 
existing curriculum content and teaching practices, they had felt reassured and relieved 
that they were already doing much of what they believed was required of them under 
the duty. As one school leader explained: 
Mapping is probably the best tool the school uses in terms of Prevent. I think there 
is a lot of Prevent goes on inside the school, but not all of it is explicit. So I think a 
lot of staff do Prevent but it’s trying to make them see that they do Prevent [...] I 
was really surprised by how much Prevent we did cover inside the school. It was 
much more prevalent than I thought it was. (R47, senior leader, school, London) 
These narratives of continuity undermined opposition to the Prevent duty in a number of 
ways. Perhaps most basically, once staff believed that the duty would not entail 
significant changes in their professional practice, Prevent ceased to be a focus for 
extensive reflection and debate. As one respondent explained: 
I think perhaps when the conversation about Prevent first began it sounded like 
something which was a little bit obscure perhaps for some people, but I think as 
soon as people said ‘it’s a type of safeguarding’ then it kind of clicked into place in 
terms of what our response should be. (R4, middle manager, college, Yorkshire) 
Narratives of continuity also engendered acceptance of the responsibilities entailed by 
the duty and gave rise to feelings of individual and collective confidence in their ability 
to assume and manage the responsibilities associated with it, while acknowledging that 
it represented a challenging area of policy and practice. As one respondent explained, 
even though there was a sense of ‘nervousness’ about ‘making the right judgement’ and 
wondering whether the police are ‘going to swoop down and sort of sirens wailing and 
arrest them’, they felt confident because, 
we talk here about the fact that we’ve got a team of experts in our own college 
under safeguarding. They refer people normally through that, so if they’re worried 
about a student self-harming or being unsafe in any other way they’d refer that 
way. And we promote Prevent as being the same thing but just with a different 
focus. (R2, senior leader, college, Yorkshire)  
Procedural confidence in turn engendered moral confidence by assuaging concerns 
about the possible negative consequences of the Prevent duty. Here the Prevent-as-
safeguarding policy frame promoted by national and local policy practitioners was 
particularly important, in part because it enabled some respondents to bracket out 
occasional expressions of parental concern about the Prevent duty by situating them 
within a longer history of parental anxieties about safeguarding. As one respondent 
observed, ‘you find that concern about safeguarding as well; people have attitudes to 
social services involvement’ (R31, support staff, school, Yorkshire), while in another 
school staff drew comparisons between parental concern about the Prevent duty and 
parental concern expressed when they first employed a dedicated social worker. 
The above observations reveal the complexity of the processes through which 
these narratives of continuity have become established. While the interview data 
indicate that the framing of Prevent as an extension of existing safeguarding practices – 
a frame accepted by a large majority of respondents – was central to the construction of 
these narratives of continuity, this framing of the Prevent duty and wider narratives of 
professional continuity were not just produced and transmitted top-down through 
official policy documentation and the work of national and local Prevent practitioners. 
Such policy understandings were also generated through institutional processes of 
policy interpretation and enactment, such as the way Prevent training was delivered 
through existing programmes of safeguarding training and the way compliance with the 
duty was managed through existing, albeit in some cases expanded or modified, 
institutional safeguarding policies and governance structures.  
What also contributed to these narratives of continuity was the way other 
existing practices came to be interpreted as commensurate with, or even as mechanisms 
through which the school or college was able to meet, perceived Prevent-related 
requirements. For example, staff in some of the London schools described their 
adoption of the Philosophy4Children (P4C) programme as part of their fulfilment of the 
requirements of the Prevent duty. This had pre-dated the Prevent duty and was 
understood by staff as part of a wider focus in the school on developing critical thinking 
and active enquiry among the students and staff, but was also seen as providing a clear 
avenue through which to bolster students’ resilience to the binaries often put forward by 
extremist groups and ideologies. Similarly, responses to the Prevent duty in other 
institutions had built directly on, and in some cases comprised a partial relabelling of, 
existing and long-established programmes of work around citizenship and equality, 
including dialogical approaches to education and initiatives such as debate clubs. We 
return to the implications of this below. 
The responsibilisation of first-line professionals 
The third process relates to emergent professional interpretations of negative policy 
outcomes and the causes of such outcomes. As described above, respondents within 
both the interview and survey samples described fairly high levels of confidence with 
regards to their ability and that of their institution in relation to the Prevent duty. This 
professional confidence served to mitigate anxieties related to the duty. Concerns about 
the difficulties of identifying ‘genuine cases’ and how this might undermine the 
effectiveness of the duty were offset by, for example, institution-wide efforts to promote 
a culture in which staff were vigilant and felt supported to report concerns ‘however 
small’ – with senior staff in most of the schools and colleges describing how they had 
developed ‘a good supportive ethos around this’ (R1, DSL, college, Yorkshire).  
Similarly, and perhaps even more importantly given the dominant critiques of 
the duty, while there were clear concerns among respondents that the duty might 
increase the risk that Muslim students experience stigmatisation, they at the same time 
spoke about how they and their colleagues managed such risks within their professional 
practice. Respondents held up as absurd the idea that they would make referrals as a 
result of a student growing a beard or starting to wear a hijab; they spoke about how 
their experience of working with young people meant that they were well aware that 
some of the supposed indicators of ‘vulnerability’ – a student becoming withdrawn, a 
sudden change of friendship group – were far from atypical behaviours for young 
people, and how therefore the referral process would always entail triangulation of 
information with other staff and assessment of other possible indicators; and almost all 
respondents described how they, as a professional, would always start by having a 
discreet conversation with the student in question.  
Measures taken to mitigate the risks of stigmatising Muslim students also 
included foregrounding democracy, active citizenship and equality in any activities 
designed to address the duty; seeking out materials that foster a balanced understanding 
of the threats posed by extremism, terrorism and radicalisation; emphasising to students 
that AQ/ISIS-inspired terrorism should not be seen as representative of Islam or 
Muslims; introducing students to some of the Prevent training materials that they 
believed conveyed that the duty was not ‘targeting’ Muslims; and even asking some of 
the post-16 students to review material before it was delivered to the rest of the school 
to check whether there was anything that could cause offence or concern among Muslim 
students. Meanwhile, DSLs described working with colleagues to help them to feel 
confident in their own professional judgement in order to reduce the number of 
unnecessary referrals. As one respondent recalled: 
…a lot of the Prevent materials, just by default, do refer to case studies that are 
linked into terrorist activities that are linked into people that are Muslim. So we 
have to work really hard in the organisation to make sure that staff understand that 
that’s not what it’s about… We use like far-right case studies when we do the 
training and we make those kinds of emphasis. I think the majority of our teaching 
staff understand that, and I think they’re very sensitive to the fact that if they’ve 
got mixed students in their group that they’ve got a responsibility to manage 
cohesion among their students. (R2, lecturer, college, Yorkshire) 
In all of the institutions, respondents expressed confidence that the sort of ‘knee-jerk 
reaction’ that gave rise to incidents such as the cucumber-cooker-bomb tragi-farce were 
unlikely to happen in their institution: 
I don’t think, we’re not the kind of school who would have these major knee-jerk 
reactions, we’d certainly talk about it as a staff and have those discussions, and 
decide what we need to do. (R29, DSL, school, Yorkshire) 
Indeed, not only did respondents describe risk mitigation strategies but, as intimated 
above, they also identified ways in which the duty had created opportunities to 
reinvigorate areas of work that were perceived to have suffered a significant policy de-
prioritisation in recent years. This included work on active citizenship, human rights, 
democracy and equality, whether within the curriculum or during additional activities 
such as debating clubs. As one respondent observed, 
I’m kind of inclined to be suspicious towards [the Prevent duty] for various 
reasons, because it’s part of a broader agenda, so I continually am suspicious of it 
in that regard. However, I think that the lessons that we’ve done around some of 
the things that I was talking about earlier, you know, gender equality and all of 
that, are kind of valid and interesting and its provided a kind of, you know, a 
reason for that to come to the fore. And that’s kind of a good thing, and that’s, so 
the practical implementation of it has been fine, the terms in which it’s introduced 
is problematic (R42, teacher, school, London)   
As Ball, Maguire and Braun (2013) identify, individual and collective confidence in 
core professional practices play and important role in how new policies are interpreted 
and enacted within educational institutions. In this case, such confidence not only 
informed respondents’ perceptions of their abilities to manage the risks associated with 
the Prevent duty, but also underpinned active identification of what they saw as the 
opportunities associated with the duty. 
Of relevance to our analysis, such articulations of professional confidence also 
entailed implicit comparisons with other institutions and professionals. The fact that 
they are not ‘the type of school’ in which ‘knee-jerk reactions’ happen means that other 
schools are that ‘type of school’, and several respondents drew distinctions between 
what the duty looks like ‘at its best’ and when it is ‘done badly’. For example: 
How would I evaluate it? Well I think when it’s at its best then I’d explain it as an 
attempt to stop vulnerable young people from being exploited by organisations 
which are not good for them, not healthy for them, and that’s a good thing [...] But 
I totally, totally accept that if done badly and where done badly, that there’s a risk 
that the wrong people could be spoken to in the wrong way and that that could, far 
from leading to a more cohesive community could lead to a less cohesive one. 
(R59, middle manager, school, London) 
Such comparisons ‘responsibilise’ individual professionals for policy failings by 
focusing professional attention on questions of policy implementation rather than policy 
design: a process characteristic of neo-liberal systems of governance (Thomas 2017). 
One of the implications of this was that respondents typically framed the most egregious 
incidents, such as the cucumber-cooker-bomb, as instances of specific institutions or 
individuals getting it wrong – problems that could be addressed through further training 
and/or better management – rather than evidence of problems with the duty per se.  
This framing of such incidents would appear to have put the discourse of some 
education professionals out-of-step with public discourse about the Prevent duty in an 
important way. While public discourse about Prevent, particularly within those sections 
of the population that are more sceptical about the strategy, is dominated by references 
to high profile false-positives that act as evidence of underlying problems with Prevent 
and the Prevent duty, such cases were conspicuous by their relative absence in the 
accounts presented by our respondents, bracketed out for the most part as individual or 
institutional errors. 
Beyond reluctant accommodation or straightforward policy acceptance 
What is revealed when we trace these three processes is that the relative absence of 
expressed opposition to the Prevent duty among education professionals is neither 
simply a story of reluctant accommodation of the Prevent duty nor, as some supporters 
of Prevent might hope, one of straightforward policy acceptance. Rather, and consonant 
with previous research on how social and education policies are put into practice (Jones 
2013) or enacted (Ball, Maguire and Braun 2013) by front-line professionals, it can be 
seen as the product of a complex set of interactions between high-level policy narratives 
and the ways in which the duty has been ‘translated’ and integrated into other, pre-
existing policy and practice regimes, including pre-existing safeguarding approaches 
and pre-existing institutional practices concerned with promoting positive values, 
inclusive citizenship and anti-prejudice norms. 
Policy practitioners at all points within the policy process ‘make sense of the 
world using the powerful persuasive tools of narrative’ (Jones, 2013: 19). The initial 
positioning of the Prevent duty by high-level policy actors as an extension of existing 
safeguarding responsibilities created an opportunity for policy practitioners, including 
local Prevent co-ordinators and DSLs, to construct the narratives of professional 
continuity that have been central to inhibiting professional opposition to the duty. Yet 
such narratives were also forged through the way that the duty was enacted in schools 
and colleges. This was partly about how DSLs and institutional safeguarding teams took 
a lead in ensuring compliance with the duty. It was also however about how existing 
professional practices came to be reinterpreted and adapted as ‘part of’ or being relevant 
to compliance with the Prevent duty – practices partly grounded in educationalists’ 
confidence in their core professional competencies to adapt to and make the most of, the 
latest of many new policies emanating from government. Indeed, in some cases this 
folding of ‘Prevent’ into existing educational practices resulted in considerable distance 
emerging between interpretations of ‘Prevent’ on the ground and understandings of 
‘Prevent’ among high-level policy actors. 
This has placed education professionals in a ‘liminal position’ (Ball et al. 2011, 
616) with regards to wider public discourses about terrorism, extremism, radicalisation, 
Prevent and community relations. On the one hand, their interpretation and enactment 
of the Prevent duty reflected their engagement with public discourses, both about the 
risks of radicalisation, and about Prevent and potential problems associated with 
Prevent. On the other hand however their professional identities, and their concomitant 
self-identification as having a privileged understanding of, in particular, safeguarding 
processes, placed them outside of, and sometimes as critics of, more general public 
debates about Prevent and the Prevent duty. Specifically, it made them less likely to 
attribute negative outcomes to policy failure and diminished the extent to which, unlike 
the general public, their interpretations and evaluations of the duty were based on the 
most egregious examples of Prevent-related practices resulting in harm and distress. It is 
this liminality, we argue, that enables us to understand the ‘tension’ in our data that we 
identified in the Introduction, between professional concerns about some of the 
potential impacts of the Prevent duty and the relative absence of overt opposition to, and 
even positive acceptance of, the duty. 
Conclusions 
The introduction of the Prevent duty initially intensified the fierce debates already 
surrounding the Prevent strategy. Given the strength of the expressed opposition to the 
duty by some of Britain’s teaching unions and civil society organisations, we might 
have expected to find widespread and broadly hostile views regarding the duty among 
education professionals. Yet such expectations were only partially borne out by the 
data. While we found evidence to support a number of well-known critiques of Prevent 
and the Prevent duty, we encountered scant expressed opposition to the duty or 
challenges to its legitimacy. 
We have argued that if we are to provide a satisfactory explanation for these 
findings it is necessary to go beyond conceiving of them either as a product of reluctant 
accommodation or as a product of straightforward policy acceptance. Rather, we 
propose that these findings emerge out of a complex interplay between effective policy 
messaging and processes of policy enactment that have served to allay or at least 
bracket-out professional anxieties about the possible negative impacts of the duty. Here, 
three processes have been particularly important: the construction of radicalisation as a 
significant societal, institutional and personal risk; the construction of continuity with 
existing professional practices; and the responsibilisation of first-line professionals for 
policy outcomes.   
There are important limitations to acknowledge with regards to this research. 
First, fieldwork was undertaken in urban regions with significant ethnic diversity and 
considerable long-term investment under the Prevent strategy. Research in other areas 
might have rendered different findings. Second, the study represents professional 
perceptions only, and there is an urgent need for research into student experiences of the 
duty’s implementation. There are also indications within the results that there are 
important ethnic and religious dimensions to how the Prevent duty is being perceived 
and experienced by education professionals. These too require further research and 
analysis, not least because they raise the disquieting prospect that some education 
professionals from ethnic and religious minorities may feel for a number of reasons that 
they are unable to express concerns they might have regarding this area of policy and 
procedure.  
Nevertheless, the findings and discussion presented above raise an analytically 
intriguing possibility: while the introduction of the duty initially intensified public 
criticism of Prevent, the way the duty has been enacted and incorporated within existing 
professional practices might in fact have given rise to significant processes of softening 
criticism of Prevent and the ‘Prevent brand’. Since plans for the duty were announced, 
Prevent-related training has been rolled out on a massive scale across the caring 
professions. In excess of 500,000 educationalists have been trained in England alone. 
There is a possibility that emergent interpretations and broad acceptance of Prevent and 
the Prevent duty within a substantial proportion of this large and culturally influential 
population could dramatically affect the balance of current public debates around 
counter-terrorism and Prevent in particular. Whether that is good or bad news will 
depend on what one thinks of PVE programmes. Based on the authors’ experience, what 
is certain is that policymakers in European, Australasian and North American countries 
are watching with interest as they consider the next steps in their efforts to prevent and 
counter violent extremism. 
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i Further education colleges in the UK are distinct from universities. They provide a range of 
usually post-16 academic, technical and professional training and education courses that 
enable progress into higher education or to begin a specific career path 
ii Minor adjustments were made to the survey prior to the booster. We removed 4 questions 
relating to school/college profiles that, due to sample size and distribution, were superfluous. 
We also inserted a question about perceptions of possible stigmatisation of ‘white working 
class’ students. We do not believe these adjustments are likely to have impacted on the 
responses to other questions in the survey. 
iii Where totals do not add up to 225, this is because some respondents either chose the ‘prefer 
not to respond’ option or skipped the question. 
iv Including estate managers, IT managers, librarians, dedicated pastoral roles, dedicated 
safeguarding or child protection roles. 
                                                 
